-Anti-utilitarian norms often are used in assessing tax systems.
INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with the normative principles that should guide tax policy assessment. The simplest and most studied norm is utilitarianism, which favors whatever regime produces the greatest *Harvard Law School and the Natlonal search, Cambndge, MA 02 138
Bureau of Economic Retotal utility. However, most tax policy analysts do not embrace utilitarianism, primarily for two reasons.
First, they find utilitarianism to be insufficiently egalitarian. It is true that utilitarianism favors equality, all things being equal, because of decreasing marginal utility of income: redistributing a dollar from the rich to the poor increases total utility. However, complete equalization is rejected because of the adverse effect of redistribution on Incentives to work. The objection to utilitarianism is that it gives insufficient weight to equality. The weight it gives is determined by the degree to which Individuals' marginal utility declines, which is now understood to be related to risk preferences. However, one might favor more equality.' A Rawlsian approach, to take an extreme, would put all weight on the poorest individual (even if most of the national wealth were sacrificed in the process).2 "Moderates" favor intermediate weights. Leading articles in the literature on the optimal degree of redistribution-the optimal income tax literature-typically report the appropriate tax rates for a range of distributional preferences; utilitarianism is presented as one polar case and the Rawlsian ap-preach as the othc?r.3 Aside from utilitarlans and followers of Rawls, however, few have attempted to offer a moral theory to justify the degree of egalitarian preference; the choice is left to intuition. No consensus or leading VIE'W has ernerged.
Second, utilitarlanvsm IS viewed as deficient for ignoring equitable concerns about the relative positions of individuals in the income distiributlon. Horizontal equity-the command that equals be treated equally-has received the greatest attention. A possibly related concern for avoiding reversals in individuals' positions in the income distribution IS often expressed. A substantial Ii terature develops equity indexes designed to measure violations of these norms, and such measures have been used to assess various tax reforms.4 There has been virtually no attempt to ground such approaches in a theory of distributive justice.5 Although many believe there are Inorms worthy of independent weight in evaluating tax reforms, there is substantial variation in proposed measures and little consensus even on basic prernises. This paper demonstrates that both criticisms of utilitarianism are fundamentally misguided, at least for policy makers who accept the Pareto principle. The Pareto principle holds that a reform preferred by all individuals should be implemented. The principle is appealing because it involves a rather limited value judgment that most find acceptable, at least in the context of rather sterile comparisons of tax reforms In which the only data presented are individuals' after-tax incomes in various regimes. The principle, however, is rarely invoked In assessing tax policy because, on its face, it is Inapplicable to real tax reforms. When there (are rnillions of tax units, it is inconceivable that any reform, no matter how wonderful, would improve literally everyone's lot. Moreover, tax polrcy oflen IS concerned with the appropriate di,strlbutlon of income, which IS not a qlestion the Pareto principle purports to a$dress.6 Nonetheless, the Paret? principle has important Implications fo[ tax policy norms. In particular, the next s~ection presents examples in which consisbent adherence to any of the anti-utllitaridn tax equity norms leads the policy maker ,to reject reforms that all tndlviduals prefpr. No one who believes In the Pareto principle can consistently accept any of the views on tax equity that are prominent in the literature.
There are two respects in which this utilitarian endorsement sh$uld not be surprising. First, there is a serise in which the utilitarian claim is obviqus. The Pareto principle, after all, comlmands that social decisions must respect 'individuals' preferences. All of the anti-utilitarian equity norms give weight to factors that are not of concern to individudls, so it is inevitable that adherence to such norms can lead to a conflict with the Pareto principle.
Second, work in decisibn theory and social choice theory esta@ished essentially the same conclusion long ago. ' Harsanyi (1953 ' Harsanyi ( , 1955 ' Harsanyi ( , 1977 offers some of the earliest and most important demonstrations.* One of his arguments involves the original position (often associated with Rawls's subsequent wark), and another involves a proof that ahy rational, consistent social decision maiker who cares about individuals' prefhrences would have to be a utilitarian. This work has not, however, penetrated dliscussions of tax policy, perhaps becausp of its technical nature and because thk Intuition for the results and their applicbtlon to tax equity norms are not immediltely apparent. For this reason, the presenp paper briefly describes these two deriqations of utilitarianism from ethically alPpealing assumptions. This survey is fol/owed by a discussion of some of the issues that have I TAX EQUITY NORMS proved controversial in these literatures to see whether they qualify the suggestron that utilitarianism is the appropriate norm for tax policy.
DEMONSTRATION THAT TAX EQUITY NORMS ARE IN FUNDAMENTAL CONFLICT WITH THE PARETO PRINCIPLE The Question Addressed
It is useful to be as precise as possible at the outset about what the examples to follow are designed to demonstrate. The question is whether one can consistently adhere to both an anti-utilitarian tax equity norm and the Pareto principle. The motivation rests on the assumption that those who believe in these norms purport to believe in them consistently. Thus, for example, if one's equity index registered -10 in considering one reform, the same index would be applied in assessing a similar reform, rather than stipulating the index to be zero if it just so happened that the latter reform involved a particular individual having income equal to some unlucky number or resulted in a violation of the Pareto principle.
Furthermore, I assume that these antiutilitarian norms are intended to have independent significance; that is, I assume they are not mere tiebreakers.g Another way to state the point is that, for whatever norm one has in mind, one would be willing to pay something, some positive amount, to avoid the violation of the norm. Thus, one would prefer an alternative regime that differed in only two respects: (1) the norm violation was eliminated or materially reduced, and (2) each individual had a little less income. The amount by which income is less can be small: a dollar, a cent, or a millionth of a cent. The point is simply that the norm has no independent significance if we should not be willing to pay even a tiny fraction of a cent to avoid violating it. The numbers indicate Income levels of two individuals, each of whom has the same utility function, where utility is simply a function of income. In regime I, the two individuals each have income of 50.
In regime II, they have incomes of 60 and 40; which individual has which income IS determined by chance, where there is a 50 percent probability of each outcome.
If one has a preference for equality, regime I is better because there is less inequality, under any conceivable measure.'O In addition, equal treatment of equals is not provided in the move to regime II. Thus, if one gives independent significance to either of these anti-utilitarian norms, regime I is superior to regime Il. (Another example, below, will address reversals in positrons in the income distribution.) I now wish to modify the example slightly, to make the choice of regimes more of a real contest. Consider the following:
Regime I Regime II 50 -C, 50 -C 3 60,40
Here, each Individual's income is lower by C In regime I (the status quo). For example, it might be that regime II is more arbitrary because it forgoes the added expense entailed by more precise rules or higher quality audits and adjudication.
Demonstration of Conflict with the Pareto Principle
Suppose first that individuals are risk neutral. That is, individuals are indifferent be-tween recetving, say, 100 of Income for certain and taking a garnble that may result in higher or lower income, but has an expected value of 100 (perhaps a double or nothing bet turning on the toss of a coin). When individuals are risk neutral, it is straightforward to show that the antiutilitarian norms conflict wtth the Pareto principle.
Begin with the Pareto principle. Each individual has an expected tncome of 50 If regime II is implemented (recall that income is 60 or 40, each outcome having a 50 percent chance). Under regime I, income is only 50 -C. All individuals, therefore, strictly prefer to move to regime II no matter how low the lev4 of C that must be paid, as long as C IS not literally zero.
By contrast, adherence to either of the anti-utilitarian norms requires selecting regime I if C IS not too high (for example, if it is a tiny fraction of a cent)." One can view C as the cost of achieving equity and ask whether incurring the cost is justified by the norm in question. As previously explored, it is assumed that one IS willing to pay something to avoid inequity. If one adopted a utilitarian norm, however, regime II would be favored because the sum of utilttles (in thrs example, reflected simply by the sum of incomes) is greatest In that regime.
The conclusion IS that utilitarianism is consistent with the Pareto principle but each of the anti-utilitarian norms conflicts with the Pareto principle. One mtght object that the assumption of risk neutrality is unrealistic and indeed removes a source of motivation for preferring regirne I. However, any equitable norm that is truly appropriate should be used consistently and should not depend on what individuals' preferences happen to be. Thus, the failure of the anti-utilitarian norms In this simple case l;hould be decisive if one accepts the Pareto principle.
Nonetheless, it is instructive to consider the case in which individuals are risk averse. !;uppose furthelr that no Insurance is available, so individupls would actually bear the' risk in movinq to regime II l2 In this casci, Individuals wbuld be willing to pay something to avoid the move to regime II because the move entails risk. Let R denote the most that indrviduals with certain Incomes of 50 would be 'willing to pay to avold imposition of this risk. I3 This amount is commonly referred to as a risk prernium. It reflects the maxlmurn amount an individual would pay for complete inrurance. In this example, insurance is unavailable if there is to be a move tcl regime II. However, insurance IS ImplIcitly available becquse it is feasible to stay in rleglme I. Staying In regime I,, however, entails a cost of G. If C <: R--that is, if the cost of implicit iflsurance is less than thcl risk premium-lndivlduals will unanimously prefer regime I. If C > R, indtviduals WIII unanimously prefer regime II. (If C I= R, each Individual will be indifferent.)
Novv consider applicatipn of the equity norms. A pure utilitarian would make precisely the same choices as individuals. In evaluating the adde$ inequality of income in regime II, a utllltarian would use Individuals' utility functions. The utilitarian IS averse to inequality by exactly the extent to which indlvidudls are averse to risk Thus, as when ind(ivlduals were assumed to be risk neutrbl, utilitananlsm is consistent with the Paqeto principle.
For the Iantl-utilltarian norms, the concluslot-1 is different. To be of any relevance, such norms must give borne weight to regime I. Moreover, they: must give more weight than utilitarianism. (If they give exactly the same weight,, they are not Independenl norms; rather! they are merely convoluted restatemenits of utilitarianism. Those who advance these norms are expressly anti-utilitarian; that is the whole Because this example is simply the combination of two instances of the initial example, it is obvious that one can analyze this case in the same manner as the preceding one. There will exist circumstances-levels of the added cost of staying in regime l-in which any anti-utilitarian norm (including a norm of avoidrng rank reversals) that entails a preference for regime I will sometimes choose regime I when all individuals would prefer the reform of moving to regime ll.15 The norm of avoiding rank reversals, therefore, also conflicts with the Pareto principle.
Remarks
The examples just presented may have a trivial air: equity norms valued in cents, individuals' choices decided by a penny. The argument, however, invokes logical consistency, and the demonstration uses small amounts to drive home the point. Even one who believes that greater equality, avoiding horizontal equity, or preventing reversals in the income distribution is worth a mere 24 per capita may find himself making choices that are unanimously opposed, that violate the Pareto principle.
I also note that, although the example is contrived, it involves no sleight of hand. The structure is simple. The character of the conflict is realistic: spending less on administration and the like often produces more arbitrariness in results. Real decisions in designing tax systems present such choices. To be sure, there usually would not be strict unanimous preference. (All it takes is one person who loses a minute when reading new instructions, only to learn that he is unaffected by the reform.) However, if evaluative norms are to be applied consistently, it hardly will do to advocate qualitatively different pnnciples depending on whether or not such a person exists. It is no answer to this inconsistency that actual examples involving violatron of the Pareto principle would not arise in practice. If they did, the con-Went policy maker who believed In any of the anti-utilitarian norms would have to trump individuals' unanimous preferences. This suggests that, at the foundational level, these princtples all conflict with the Pareto prtnciple.
Related to the foregolng point, one might object that the inconsistency arose only In cases of uncertainty. Could one not adopt an anti-utllrtarian norm It-1 cases of certainty? Such a response, however, Involves an inconsistent tleory of dlstnbutlve justice. Individuals' utilities would be weighted in an anti-utilitarian manner If they arose from a certain, fully predictable process, but identical post-reform utilities would be weighted in some other manner (a utilitarian manner) tf t.hey happen to arise from a reform that entails some uncertainty. Not only would social evaluation depend up07 such morally trrelevant factors such as whether nature was sufficiently predictable in a given case, but one's distributive norm would also depend upon the details of Information that the po1ic.y maker possessed. If there was uncertainty given available information (would Bill 0' Jill get 60 rather than 40?), one norm would apply. If, just before deciding, the pcllicy maker learned the identity of the winner, another norm would apply, even though the personal identities of the winner and loser are morally irrelevant and vvould be ignored under either norm.16 Nonetheless, ii: may stll appear appropriate to some that added weight he given to equality (beyond that entailed by utilitarianism) when evaluating a purely redistributive reform. However, if the same evaluative norm is to be used to assess a subsequent reforrn, which has characteristics like those in the preceding examples, the recommendation may involve a conflict with the Paretc principle. For example, such an egalitarian norm would favor a reform from regime II to regime I even though, once one arrived in regime I, the Pareto principle bould require movIng back to regime II.
The preceding discussipn establishes that adklererrce to the Pareto principle and anti-utllltarlan norms ihvolves an inconsisteni:y. Logrcally, one 01 the other must be rejected." I would argle that the Pareto principle In this contex/t is simple and compelling. By contrasit, the other norms are essentially ad hoc, never having been derived or justified directly. In addition, such norms have ofted been motivated by c?xamples and analcpgles that might be better L nderstood on other grounds.'* Various cntrcisms of the Pareto principle are essentially unrelatqd to the present argurnenl, as will be exdlained below. Thus, the comparative stren th of the Pareto principle and the dou f t surrounding the competing norms suggest that t.he latter rattler than the formeri be abandoned. The arguments in the next section reinforce this view.
THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE FOR UTILITARIANISM
Although only a simple! example, the preceding Idemonstration isuggests that tax policy makers should l$e utilitarians if they hold individual welfar4 in sufficient regard that unanimous preference for (3 regime should not be trumped. It is useful to supplement this argur$ent with two more systematic affirmative ,arguments for utilitarianism that t-iarsanyi and others have developed.lg As it turns out, there is a close connect.ion bet ments and the example.
The Veil of Ignorance
Although the veil of ignorance has come to be associated with RawIs ' (1971) argument that we should t/naximize the wellbeing of the worst-off individual, the construct was used earliev by tiarsanyi (1953) and Vickrey (1945) , who argued that a utilitarian approach follows. Their reasoning is straightforward.
A normatively appealing way to conceptualize disinterested social choice is to assume that rndividuals do not know their actual position in society. In particular, each person behind the veil of ignorance is just as likely to be one person (say, the richest person) as another (the poorest person). If the total population is N, a person behind the veil reasons: I have a l/N chance of being each person i, whose utility in regime X is U,(X); the best I can do for myself is to maximize my expected utility, N which is A s U,(X). Thus, individuals ,-1 behind the veil would choose the regime that maximizes the sum (average) of individuals' utilities.
The individual's situation is logically equivalent to one in which he knows his rdentity, has actual control over a decision, and knows that there are N equally likely outcomes that have associated utilities U,(X). Von Neumann and Morgenstern (among others) have rigorously demonstrated that minimal assumptions of rationality imply the maximization of expected utility. If individuals in the original position are rational, therefore, it must be that they would be utilitarians, Rawls' contrary assertions notwithstanding.20 (One might also note that even individuals in the world who know their circumstances would tend to favor some utilitarian element in policy making. After all, many individuals, particularly the young, face significant uncertainty about their future well-being, and those concerned about their descendants will have an even greater concern for the average well-being of members of society.)
Rational Social Choice
Harsanyi (1955) offered a second derivation of utilitarianism. This approach makes three sets of assumptions. (1) Individuals are rational utrlrty maximizers. (This is a descriptive rather than a normative assumptron.) (2) Social choice also should be rational, namely: alternatives should be completely and consistently (transitively) ordered, social welfare should rise if outcomes improve, and welfare should be continuous in probabilities (e.g., a policy with a slightly higher chance than another of a better outcome should be slightly preferred). (3) Social choice should appropriately reflect individuals' preferences: if all individuals are indifferent between two regimes, the choice should socially be one of indifference, social welfare should rise rather than fall with individual welfare, and each individual should receive equal weight.
Under these assumptions, Harsanyi proved that socral choices must conform to the dictates of utilitarianism: the unique social welfare function maximizes the sum of individuals' utilities. The normative appeal has two elements, corresponding to the second and third sets of assumptions: social choices should be rational, and they should even-handedly reflect individuals' preferences. (The latter requirement, it should be noted, implies that social choices are consistent with the Pareto principle.) Although not immediately apparent, and perhaps even counterintuitive, a utilitarian prescription necessarily follows.
Given this derivation, the prior demonstration that all the anti-utilitarian tax policy norms conflict with the Pareto principle is not surprising. Harsanyi rigorously showed that respect for individuals' wellbeing of the sort embodied in the Pareto principle, combined with logical consistency of social decisions, implies utilitarianism. The method of Harsanyi's proof exploits properties of consistency when decisions involve uncertainty. My examples similarly involve uncertainty, which often exists in the realm of tax policy.
Moreover, as already noted, the examples could be seen as involving uncertainty in a different sense: there may be no uncertainty regarding the effects of a reform, but only concerning the identities of winners and losers. Disinterested social policy requires that social choices not depend on these identlties. (Decisions may depend on whether, e.g., a particular loser is rich or poor, but not on which rich person or which poor person is the loser.) This, in turn, IS similar to a veil of ignorance construct, in which utilitarianism is also implied Remarks It IS useful to identify the IntuItions behind the utilitarian result in the precedlng examples and Harsanyi's derivations. First, the Pareto pnnclple (and similar requirements) demands that social welfare respond directly and exclusively to individuals' welfare. Anti-utilitarian norms inject value judgments that are divorced from and may conflict with individuals' welfare.
(The examples show hclw this can occur.) Second, decision theorists demonstrated a half century ago that rationality In individual decision making implies the maximization of expected utility, a summation over possible outcomes (measured in utility). Analogous reasoning has been used to show that rationality in social decision making implies the maximizatton of the summation of possible outcomes, measured in Individuals' utilities.
DISCUSSION
Prior examples indicate that anti-utilitarian tax equity norms are rn fundamental conflict with a respect for unanirnous indivldual preferences (the Pareto principle), and the preceding section presents two affirmative derivations of utilitarianism frorn ethically appealing assumptions. Nonetheless, a range of consrderatrons and objections need to be examined; even most committed Jtilitarians admit qualifications of some sort. A brief paper on tax equity nonns cannot be the place for a comprehensive analysis or defense. It is approprlate, however, to consicIer some of the isSue'j.
My claim in this section is that many objections to the Pareto principle or utllitananlsm, If persuasive, are either inapplicable in the present context or call for adjustments. Most importantly, such arguments do not support the sorts of antiutilitarian principles that are critcized in this article. I believe, therefore, to have made a pm-m facie cage against these departures from utilitarianism. Adherents to conflicting tax equity norms need to present some affirmative justification for their views and for particular Indexes designed to implement them. Indeed, it is unclear how one c,an proceed intelligently with the measurement of air giving weight to such norms without knowing more precisely what they are or why we think they exi5t.21
Critiques of the Pafqto Principle
The present argument depends upon accepting the Pareto principle, so the primary way to avoid the utilitarian concluslon IS to reject the prilnciple. One criticism of the Pareto'principle is that it takes individuals preferences as given. IIIdividuas may be misinformed (they may misjudge the probabili~ty of an event), their judgment may be questioned at a deeper level (paternal&m), or some preferences (envy, racism)~may simply be rejected as morally Irrelevant. However, accepting these criticismis does not seriously affect the present arg merit. One could P substitute "corrected' preferences for actual preferences. 22 Thus, the policy maker could consider individbals' "true" utility rather than perceived futility or could ignore utility arising from impermissible preferences. 'Then, thq Pareto principle applied to these adjusked preferences would lronflict with edch anti-utllltarian norm but would be consistent with utilitarianism applied to the adjusted preferences. Note, moreover, that none of these criticisms about individuals' preferences provides a justification for any of the anti-utilitarian norms. In the tax policy context, these norms have simply been applied to levels of after-tax income; there is no connection between the norms and indexes, on one hand, and any misunderstanding of tax reforms or improper expenditure of income, on the other hand.
Another possibility is that individuals might have direct preferences for the distributional characteristics reflected in antiutilitarian norms: for example, they may want incomes to be equal. Theoretically, this is wholly consistent with the Pareto principle and utilitarianism: individuals' utilities would reflect these aspects of the income distribution and the correct procedure would be to sum the utilities thus defined. One would not engage in axiomatic derivations of equity indexes or ponder characteristics of the just society ' in the manner of a moral philosopher. Rather, this question is empirical, so one would conduct opinion polls or engage in other research about the preferences of typical citizens. 23 Those advancing antiutilitarian tax equity norms have not claimed that the particular concerns for equity and distribution, as captured in various proposed measures, have a real correspondence to individuals' actual preferences.24
In addition, whatever individuals' preferences about such equitable norms might be, there is some question as to whether they should be given weight in the described manner. It has been suggested that individuals should be viewed as having two sets of preferences: personal preferences about their own well-being (and others to whom they feel attachments) and moral preferences about what society should be like.25 If they are morally worthy citizens, they would vote for policy based on the latter preferences. However, when an individual asks why she should hold a particular social preference, one might expect the reasons to be concerned with effects on individuals. To incorporate social judgments into personal preferences confuses the issue. Moreover, it results in circularity. If an equity norm is initrally held by all, but is in error, how could it ever be criticized? If all hold it, all favor it; therefore, society should act on it. The present paper is designed to show that the anti-utilitarian norms, which have not been independently justified, are probably mistaken because In principle they can require choosing regimes that are to everyone's detriment. If most individuals make this same mistake, they might indeed vote for such regimes, and one could then argue that the result is not truly to everyone's detriment. However, on reflection, I suggest, if the only appeal of the norm is that it matches current belief, it qualifies as a personal preference but not as an independent ethical norm. Furthermore, if the present analysrs is correct, such a preference might be changed with sufficient education (and thus it may be better called a belief than a true preference), and such mistaken preferences are, as noted previously, ones that some utilitarians might deem it appropriate to ignore.
Other questions about the Pareto principle have been raised.26 The main point to note is that objections are almost invariably of two types. First, there are objections to basing social decisions on Individual welfare. However, the antr-utilitarian tax policy norms are generally based directly on individual welfare (or income as a surrogate for welfare). Second, one may question whether social welfare is always affected positively by individual welfare. For example, a distribution in which both the rich and the poor have incomes of 10 might be deemeo preferable to one in which the rich have 50 and the poor have 40. If one accepts such a view, the appropriate anti-utilitarian norm would be rather different from, aid more striking than, the prrnciples of tax equity that have been advanced in the literature.
Other Criticisms of Utilitarianism
The Pareto prlnctple IS not sufficient to derive utilitarianism. For example, selfish dictatorship (choose the policy that is in Joe's best Interest, without regard to the welfare of everyone elsl2) is consistent with the Pareto principle: no policy preferred by the dictator would ever be trumped. The preceding section explorc?d the additional assumptions used in denvatlons of utilitarianism, namely that social choices be rational and give equal weight to each individual.
Utilitananlsm entails, however, aIn additional premise (one shared with the antiutilitarian equitable norms): Interpersonal comparisons of utility are assumed to be meaningful.27 Despite the emphasis on ordinalism in welfare economics during the middle of the twentieth century, It is now generally accepted that interpersonal comparisons of utility are necessary if distributional judgments are to be made."* For example, a statement that a rich person has greater well-being than a poor person, at least on average, involves a comparison of utility levels. Suggesting that a dollar is generally worth rnore to the poor than to the rich involves comparing marginal contrbutions to utrlrty. Several writers have addressed this subject, and it IS not pertinent to the choice among norrns addressed here.2g
There is also a question of the descriptive perspective adopted w/yen applying tax equity norms.3o For example, regime II can be described V-I terms of flnal incomes (in the table) or In terms of the actual risks to which each individual is exposed (In the verbal descrlptlon, in which each Indlvidual In the first example has a fifty-fifty chance af an Income of 60 or 40). To a utilitarian, these descriptions are equivalent. However, differerlt descrlpt ions may lead to dlfferent socialljudgments for anti-utilitarians.
For exgmple, risk-neutral Individuals are Indifferlnt between 50 for sure and a fifty-fifty cqance of 60 or 40, ancl the utilitarian criterion assesses both worlds t?qually Yet the anti-utilitarian ludgmelts deem the final result--one person 'wItI 60 and the other with 40-to be inferior to that I~+I which each has 50. Nonetheless, if regime II is described as glvinig each lndividdal the same type of lottery Ilcket, some anti-utilitarians (who believe In "ex ante equtty") might adopt the view that no inequity is involved when moving to regirrhe II. This, in turn, would ralvage their pqsitlon as consistent with the Pareto principle.
There are serious probilems with this defense. First, as the eqyity norms have been presented in the literature, measured by Indexes, and applied in evaluating actual tax reforms, this is not the approach taken. (Indeed, when the choice is addressed, an ex post view IS usually favored.) Second, In the actual contexts in which these norms arcI advocated--general tax reforms that hiave a range of difficult-to-predict effects+-the lottery description IS Indeed accprate, if not with regard to effects on otierall inequality (which are often but not always intended:), then at least with regard to much unequal treatment of equals and rank reversals that rnav arise. Even when particular winners and losers can be identified it-advance upon investigation, they are hardly known to the policy rnaker who is relying upon rgsults from largescale simulations that use an anonymous database. Thus, the information avaIlable to the social decision ti-naker IS precisely that described in the dxamples.
Indeed, the previous discussion shows how one can characterize reforms as Involving two steps: (1) the reform is analyzed using aggregate data, and (2) a further investigation is undertaken to determine the personal identities of the winners and losers. Implrcitly, the argument IS that a wholly different normative evaluatron must be performed after step 2 than after step 1. Alternatively, step 1 could be deemed the proper point of evaluation, which would salvage consistency with the Pareto principle but eliminate the practical bite of horizontal equity and rank reversal norms.
There remains the claim that the ex ante income distribution should be more egalitarian than a utilitarian would require. This raises a final problem: the arbitrariness of the status quo, which was produced by a series of prior reforms spanning years, decades, and even centuries.31 If the ex ante view is adopted, should one not go all the way back, to an "original position" before individuals know anything about what will transpire in the world? As already noted, from that position utilitarianism would immediately follow.
A rather different critique of utilitarianism involves taking a libertarian approach, under which regimes are not evaluated by any sort of welfare function but rather with regard to whether designated entitlements are respected. Any distributive effect that infringed upon entitlements might be decisive against a reform. It is not clear that any modern tax system would be legitimate under this view, unless one invokes ex ante social contract reasoning. If the social contract is entered after individuals know their abilities to earn income, they would not unanimously consent to much redistribution, and it is likely that there would be at least one vote against virtually any regime. If the social contract is imagined to be entered behind a veil of ignorance, however, utrlrtananrsm would be the unanrmous choice, so there would be no conflrct. Finally, It should be noted that none of the anti-utilitarian tax equity norms in the literature are Implied by libertarianism. Libertarians are not concerned with unequal treatment or rank reversals per se; they object to any reduction in welfare that violates entitlements. In particular, a reform that moved all individuals' incomes closer to the mean, with perfect equal treatment and no rank reversals, is just the policy usually offered to illustrate what libertarians find most objectionable about taxation. However, such a reform satisfies or advances all the antiutilitarian tax equity norms considered here.
Institutional Considerations
Many commentators have objected that utilitarianism is Insufficiently concerned about the process by which a particular distribution of income might be generated. Such concerns no doubt motivate the attention devoted to horizontal inequity and rank reversals. Inequity may be arbitrary, arise from improper action (perhaps discrimination against minorities or political opponents), or reflect a denial of equal opportunity.
These concerns should be taken seriously, but they are not directly pertinent to tax equity norms of the sort proposed in the literature. Consider the unequal treatment or change In positions in the income distribution that arises in the tax reforms that have been analyzed. Virtually all such inequity is produced in one of two ways. First, there is simply the randomness described above, which is inevitable when uncertainty is ubiquitous and perfect administration is costly if not impossible.33 Second, inequity may arise when particular provisions are intentionally changed, but then the change may be evaluated directly. For example, raising the personal exemption for the blind will treat unequally individuals with the same income but who differ with respect to eyesight. As a matter o; equity, one might favor or oppose such a change, but a horizontal equity index would be superfluous because it begs the question whether eyesight is relevant to the social allocatlon of resources. a4 Alternatively, raising the personal exemption for everyone would treat unequally famllres with the same income but different numbers of dependents. However, to Invoke horlzontal equity to oppose such a change assumes that different-r;lzed families are equals In the normatively relevant sense, which begs the questlo? about the proper treatment of dependents. Those favoring the change would argue that the higher exemption is necessary to measure and compare the welfare of different families in a proper manner--that is, to determine who are the equals who should be treated equally. j5
By contrast to such Instances of possible inequity, some tax policies raise real process concerns. For example, a method of audit may give too much opportunity for abuse by government cfficials, or a tax court might be btased against racial minorities. It IS wholly consistent with utilltarianism-particularly rule utllitarianism-that systems should be designed with a concert-for minimizing such problems.36
The anti-utilltanan tax equity norms do not address this Issue directly. Nonetheless, paying attention to horizontal equity and rank reversals might sometimes be useful In this context because the observatlon of a violation can molivate investigations into the cause of "inequity," which might occasionally turn out to Involve improper behavior that can then be corrected. The equity It-dex In this instance would be used as a warning slgnal, just as a doctor might consider an otherwise benign physical symptom In deciding whether to perform a diagnostic prol:edL re. Such use of an equity index, however, is qualitatively different from using the index to measure the weight to be given to an indepeqdent norm in assessing policy, particulhrly in a context like tax reform in whrch thb Index will routinely indicate vlolatioris that are innocuous.
CONCLWON
In assessing tax policy, there IS disagreement about how egalitarian the income distrlbutlon should be iln light of the incentive problerns caused by redistributive taxation. Additional ethical concerns have been ra se&notably, that horizontal inequity and reversals in individuals' POW tions in the Income di$nbution should be avoided. Usually, the dorms and indexes are merely stipulated dr are supported by ad lhoc appeals to intuition.
The central argument presented here is that all tax equity norms that depart frorn utilitarianism are incorisistent with adherence to the Pareto priyciple, a belief that reforms preferred by eiveryone should be adopted. Most tax policy analysts believe In the Pareto principle. Moreover, there exist ethlcally appealing derivations of the utllltari;in norm. Althopgh objections and qualificatrons have Ion' been noted, It appears that none un ermine the present 8 arguments or provide g lustification for the anti-utllltarian pnn~iples and indexes developed in the literature. As a result, the case against theseiother tax equrty norms and In favor of ~utilltananlsm IS strong. At a minimuml it IS hard to justify continued adherence $0 the antlutilitarian norms until a serious effort is made to defend them ~more directly and to expkln why the Pareto principle should not merely be qualified, but wholeheartedly rejected. Rawls (1971 ), Sen (1973 . For an apparent retraction, see Arrow (1973) . Rejecting individuals' risk preferences in this context involves paternalism, as indicated in note 22. Observe that rejection of risk preferences does not necessarily imply a greater preference for equality than that implied by utilitarians rather than less. Absent a contrary derivation from a specific theory of distributive justice, there is no guarantee that an analyst's intuition about distributive weights will entail more of a desire to avoid low incomes than is reflected in various individuals' utility functions.
It is common to refer to this approach as "Rawlsian" due to Rawls' (1971) advocacy of this position, although the actual implementation of his egalitarian norm in tax policy and social choice theory often departs from his particular presentation.
See, e.g., Atkinson (1973) , Mirrlees (1971 ), Stern (1976 . Atkinson suggests broader extreme boundaries, as when there is an antiParetian preference for greater equality.
See, e.g., Aronson and Lambert (1994) , Atkinson (1980) , Berliant and Strauss (1993), Feldstein (1976) , King (1983) , Musgrave (1990), Plotnick (1981) .
Most articles are entirely silent on this question. Indexes are stipulated, with features defended or criticized using ad hoc appeals to intuition.
For a critique, see Kaplow (1989) . (That article also suggests that concerns for horizontal equity dissolve into a risk aversion, or concerns for vertical equity, which is suggestive of the argument here.) Musgrave (1990) seeks to defend horrzontal equity by indicating how it is not affronted by various theories of distributive justice in a simple, first-best world, even though it IS violated in a more complicated world. The Index he offers, however, does not purport to derive from any of the distributive theories he discusses.
6 The Pareto princrple does imply that the pol-ICY maker should not be more egalitarian than Rawls' extreme position. Similarly, It Implies a limit on the weight that may be given various equity norms: It would conflict with a horizontal equity norm of such weight that two "equals" would be given an income of 50 rather than allowing one to get 60 and the other 70. 7 In the tax policy literature, Stiglitz (1982) established the possible inconsistency between a concern for horizontal equity and the Pareto principle.
However, this aspect of his article did not provoke much reaction, perhaps because the article (including the title) emphasized the conflict of horizontal equity with utilitananrsm rather than with the Pareto principle and because most of the article uses complex analysis to establish subtle points about the optimality of randomization in taxation.
8 The present paper's examples and some of the discussron are close in spirit to Harsanyi's original work as well as other work in decision theory and social choice theory, partrcularly Fleming (1952) , Hildreth (1953 ), Maskin (1978 , Myerson (1981) , Ng (1981 ), Strotz (1958 ), and Vickrey (1945 , 1960 l< That IS, R IS the amount of Income such that U(50 -R) = 0.5 x U(60) + 0.5 x U(40), where C/ is the utility function. When Indlviduals are risk averse, F is positive. It will be obvious that any positive amount, say, 2 millionths of a cent, will do for the argument. The only complication iz that one must decide how to allocate the cost C between the "rich"
and "poor" in regime I, When indlviduals are risk averse, it suffices to set C,;,,l C,,,, equal to bJRpoo,.
Thus, if C,,,, < RrItf, (which, given how the tost ratio is set, implies Cpc,,, <I Rpoor), individuals would unanimously prefer regime I. See, e.g., Harsanyi (1955 Harsanyi ( , 1977 A possible response is that the moral philosophers deem a norm to be correct based upon their reflection and intuition; therefore, the "true" best interest of all individuals, if they are to be moral persons, involves having such a preference.
And, because we believe in paternalism, we should impute this personal preference for our asserted norm, so the correct utilitarian position is to take the norm into account in making social decisions. Although one could argue this, some affirmative justification for the norm seems necessary, and the problem of avoiding criticism through circular argument that is described
In the text to follow is present.
Interestingly, one could generate the sort of anti-utrlttarran norms discussed here-greater egalitarianism, avording unequal treatment and reversals in posrtron--lf one assumed that tndividuals were very envious, but envy IS precrsely the sort of preference that many are inclined to Ignore even when individuals actually have such feelings. For example, individuals who receive promotions do not share their pay raises with peers to whom they feel similarly situated. To be sure, some aspects of the income distribution may affect individuals' preferences. Thus, Gurr (1970) argues that "relative deprivation"
is an Important cause of social unrest and revolution.
However, the empirical claims he makes concern the relationship between groups' well-being and their expectations, which may be Influenced by gains of relevant reference groups, rather than the bare fact of unequal Income. See, e.g., Harsanyi (1955 Harsanyi ( , 1975 (1955, 1975, 1977) , Sen (I 979). It has often been suggested that utilitarianism imposes greater demands than a RawlSian approach because it requires cornpal?-sons of unrts of utility rather than merely utility levels. See, e.g., Arrow (1973) . However, this view is largely mistaken, because cardinality of individual utility (implred by rational choice under uncertainty) and rnterpersonal comparability of utility levels together rmply sufficient comparability of utility units for utrlitarianisrn.
See Ng (1984 
